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Introduction
The expected dawn of a new technological era has
certainly begun when IBM offered their first commer-
cially available 20-Qubit Quantum Computers Novem-
ber 2017. While it was still discussed if it was necessary
to take quantum technology into account in the IT in-
dustry during the last year, the estimations about their
capability evolvement become much more specific now.
Luckily scientific researchers have specialized in the
examinations of the various resulting challenges and
questions since the beginning of this century. A series
of conferences about post-quantum cryptography, the
PQCrypto, started in 2006. Since 2010, they take place
in another town of the world every year. The follow-
ing article gives an overview of current developments in
algorithmic solutions answering the upcoming threats
posed by quantum computers as well as unsolved prob-
lems in the classical IT landscape.
Quantum Technologies
Quantum-mechanical phenomena, such as superposi-
tion and entanglement, are used for communication,
computing, sensoring and simulation. While commu-
nication, sensoring and simulation have been realized in
publicly announced projects or products, quantum com-
puting was only a matter of research until last november.
With the advent of 49 qubit processors quantum
supremacy lies within reach, i.e. the potential ability of
quantum computing devices to solve problems that clas-
sical computers practically cannot solve [2, 3]. IBM has
announced to have built a 50 qubit prototype, Google
participates in the race with their new record-breaking
72-qubit quantum processor Bristlecone.
Benefits
Quantum technologies offer and promise major bene-
fits. So called adiabatic quantum computers, e.g. the
D-Wave 2000Q with 2048 qubits from D-Wave Systems
in Canada are able to solve optimization problems that
would overburden a classical computer. Photon based
quantum key distribution devices from ID Quantique in
Switzerland are used by the government in Geneva and
other institutions. China has built the 2000km quan-
tum communication channel QUESS between Beijing
and Shanghai for banks, the Xinhua News Agency and
the government, whose nodes receive keys from their
quantum communication satellite. Last year they de-
noted feasible distances up to 1200 km.
In the future quantum computers with enough stable
qubits are expected to be able to help building complex
materials as well as solve medical and environmental
problems amongst other things.
Threats
It is long known that the security of currently used cryp-
tographic algorithms relying on the hardness of integer
factorization and finding discrete logarithms (DLOG
systems) [1] will expire with potent enough quantum
computers. All public parameters like public keys from
asymmetric key pairs can then be used to compute the
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corresponding private keys. With the knowledge of
those private keys, encrypted data which was collected
and assigned to the relevant key exchanges, will no
longer remain secret. For technologies like public dis-
tributed ledgers, where encrypted data is publicly avail-
able, this threat is even more serious.
Solutions
Quantum Key Distribution
QKD is an implemented cryptographic protocol for key
distribution involving components of quantum mechan-
ics. The security of encryption that uses quantum key
distribution relies on the foundations of quantum me-
chanics. In this context, the process of measuring a
quantum system in general disturbs the system itself.
So any third party trying to gain knowledge of the key
would be detected by the original communication par-
ties.
Quantum key distribution networks have already been
established in China (QUESS), Austria (SECQC), Japan
(Tokyo QKD Network), Switzerland (SwissQuantum)
and the USA (DARPA). Disadvantages for widespread
practical usage are limited distances between communi-
cation partners and the need of expensive hardware.
Rarely mentioned is the fact that message source au-
thentication does not come with QKD genuinely. Man
in the middle attacks are also possible if the communi-
cation parties do not agree on an authentication protocol
beforehand.
Post-Quantum Cryptography
The alternative to QKD are algorithms whose security
rely on mathematical properties, like hardness of com-
puting the inversion of a one way function even with a
quantum computer. There are four mathematical areas
which offer solutions for encryption, key exchanges and
signatures. Some of them are still in the middle of the
research process, others have been observed and chal-
lenged for years. The advantages of post-quantum cryp-
tography are that they can run effectively on currently
used devices such as smart phones, desktops and IoTs
and they can be enabled by simple software updates.
Code-Based
Syndrome decoding of linear error-correcting codes are
NP-complete considered as a decision problem if the
number of errors are unbounded. On the other hand,
some classes of linear codes have very fast decoding al-
gorithms. The basic idea of a code-based crypto system
is to choose a linear code with fast decoding algorithm
and disguise it as a general linear code. Then the at-
tacker has to use syndrome decoding for decrypting the
message while the message receiver, who also set up the
system, can remove the disguise and use the fast decod-
ing algorithm.
MCELIECE and the NIEDERREITER cryptosystems
are two basic encryption schemes built on this setup.
MCELIECE was the first scheme using randomization
in the encryption process. Both systems consist of three
algorithms:
1) Probabilistic key generation algorithm producing
an asymmetric key pair
2) Probabilistic encryption algorithm
3) Deterministic decryption algorithm
The private key is an (n, k)-linear error correcting
code represented by a generator matrix G, with a known
efficient decoding algorithm. Originally binary Goppa
Codes with the Patterson decoding algorithm were used.
The public key is the generator matrix G perturbated by
two randomly chosen invertible matrices S and P
G′ = SGP
where S, a (k× k) matrix, functions as a scrambler and
P is a (n × n) permutation matrix. Parameters pro-
posed by MCELIECE [4] result in a public key of 216
bytes size. The most effective attacks on MCELIECE
use information-set decoding. To resist those in a quan-
tum computing context, key sizes have to be increased
by a factor of 4.
The NIEDERREITER scheme [5] applies the same idea
to a parity check matrix H of a linear code. The encryp-
tion is about ten times faster than McEliece. McEliece
was originally believed not to be usable for authentica-
tion or signature schemes because the encryption algo-
rithm is not one-to-one and the total algorithm is truly
asymmetric, meaning, encryption and decryption do not
commute. However, a one-time signature scheme based
on MCELIECE and NIEDERREITER was proposed at the
Asiacrypt in 2001 [6]:
1) Choose a hash function h and compute the hash
value h(d) of the document d which has to be be
signed
2) Decrypt the hash value h(d) as if it was an in-
stance of the ciphertext
3) Append the decrypted hash value to the document
as a signature
As the second step in the signature scheme almost al-
ways fails, the system additionally specifies a determin-
istic way of tweaking d until a hash value h(d) is found
which can be decrypted. Verification then applies the
public encryption function to the signature to the signa-
ture and compares it to the hash value of the document.
The most recently published code-based key exchange
protocol is OUROBOROS [7]. It uses quasi-cyclic codes
in Hamming metric in the encryption algorithm, ef-
ficient decoding is achieved through bit flipping in
the Random Oracle Model. Encryption and decryp-
tion are faster than RSA for comparative benchmarks
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(https://bench.cr.yp.to). Ouroboros’ integration into the
OpenSSL/TLS library is planned and it is proposed as
post-quantum secure algorithm at the NIST.
Hash-Based
This domain is limited to digital signatures schemes
which rely exclusively on the security of the underlying
hash functions so far. The signatures themselves reveal
a part of the signing key and can only be used for one
message, same as it is known from one-time pads such
as visual cryptography shares.
Merkle tree signature schemes, introduced in 1979,
combine a one-time signature scheme with a Merkle
tree structure. Building blocks of the Merkle trees are
one-time signature key pairs, with the node at the top
being the global public key. This typically 256 bit large
key can be verified with the path to another given pub-
lic one-time key in the tree using a sequence of tree
nodes, called the authentication path. The global pri-
vate key is usually derived from a seed generated by a
pseudo random number generator and has the size of
256 bits as well. Hereby, the number of possibilities for
such signatures are all possible combinations of the sim-
ple one-time signatures within the tree structure. This
procedure considerously enhances the security of the
scheme against brute force attacks.
The latest performance improved hash-based signature
scheme is SPHINCS+[8], the advanced SPHINCS [9]
scheme which was presented at EUROCRYPT 2015.
Unlike its predecessors, XMSS and LMS, it is state-
less, meaning that signing doesn’t require updating the
secret key. It is a so called few-times scheme, where
"few-times" means as much as after 264 signatures it is
necessary to reinitiate the complete scheme. Its signa-
ture sizes range from 8kb for NIST security level 1 to
30kb for NIST security level 5.
Lattice-Based
Lattice based codes come with the challenge of finding
the nearest lattice point or a shortest basis for a given
lattice. Both problems and their approximate adequates
have been solved with NP-hard algorithms only. Given
they are one of the longest known public key crypto sys-
tems, they can be fairly seen as the most promising post
quantum crypto approaches. Low memory requirements
and high speed computations let them run effectively on
all currently and widely used devices. However, due to
their significantly bigger key sizes they had not been as
thoroughly researched and applied as RSA, EL GAMAL
[10] or DLOG systems.
NTRU was the first successful lattice-based asymmetric
cryptosystem. It was was proposed and patented in 1996
[11]. With the expiration of the patent in 2016, NTRU
Prime [12], an improvement by eliminating worrisome
algebraic structure could be published. Their security
rely on the interaction of a polynomial mixing system
with the independence of reduction modulo two rela-
tively prime integers p and q.
Another popular ingredient of lattice-based algorithms
is the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. It was used
in BCNS [13], which phrased Peikerts key encapsula-
tion algorithm as a key exchange protocol. BCNS was
the first lattice-based algorithm which was integrated
into the OpenSSL library.
With NEW HOPE [14] an improvement was achieved
by chosing more efficient parameters and shifting from
LWE to Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE). The NEW
HOPE protocol allows man in the middle attacks, mes-
sage authentication has to be implemented additionally.
Google ran an experiment by using NEW HOPE em-
bedded in an ECC procedure for a certain number of
connections between the Chrome browser and their own
servers in 2016. Since 2017, Infineon works on the first
generation of contactless post-quantum chips with Pöp-
pelmann, one of the authors of the NEW HOPE paper.
DILITHIUM [15], a module-lattice-based signature
scheme was designed with the intention to be easy to
implement against side-channel attacks, while offering
comparable efficiency to previously developed lattice-
based signature schemes. The key innovation is the
replacement of Gaussian sampling by uniformly ran-
dom sampling over a bounded domain. Furthermore,
the public key sizes are reduced by more than a factor
of 2.
All these algorithms except BCNS are submitted to
the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization
process.
Multivariate
The proven NP-hardness and NP-completeness of solv-
ing multivariate polynomial equations over a finite field
F are the reason why schemes with those asymmet-
ric cryptographic primitives are considered good candi-
dates for post-quantum security. Most of the published
schemes use multivariate quadratics, namely polynomi-
als of degree two.
The basic scheme consists of two affine transformations
S : Fn → Fn
T : Fm → Fm
and an easy to invert quadratic map
P ′ : Fm → Fn
The trapdoor (S−1, P ′−1 , T−1) represents the private
key, whithout which the public key P = S ◦ P ′ ◦ T is
assumed to be hard to invert.
A first multivariate quadratic scheme, C∗ [16], was pre-
sented at the EUROCRYPT CONFERENCE 1988. After
it was broken [17], the general principal was used for
stronger schemes, such as HIDDEN FIELD EQUATIONS
[18] and QUAD [19].
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Multivariate signature schemes provide the shortest sig-
natures amongst post-quantum algorithms (GUI [20]
129 bit over GF (2) for a quantum security level of
80 bit). The signature x of a message m is created
by hashing m into a vector y ∈ Fn and computing
x = P−1(y) = T−1(P ′(S−1(y))). The receiver can
simply compute the hash y and check if P (x) = y.
MEDIUM FIELD SIGNATURE SCHEMES [21] with
fewer equations and variables in the public key offer
a further reduction in key sizes, greater efficiency and
scalable levels of security. A proposal is submitted to
the NIST standardization process of post-quantum sig-
nature schemes.
Isogeny-Based
One of the latest and most challenging post-quantum
crypto ideas is the application of isogeny based encryp-
tion schemes like SUPERSINGULAR ISOGENY DIFFIE-
HELLMANN (SIDH). With 2688-bit public keys at a
128-bit quantum security level, this scheme uses the
smallest keys amongst post-quantum key exchanges.
Additionally it supports perfect forward secrecy, a prop-
erty which preserves the confidentiality of old com-
munication sessions even if long-term keys have been
compromised.
Although they are not as thoroughly researched as the
previously mentioned schemes, Microsoft published
an experimental VPN-library with a SUPERSINGULAR
ISOGENY KEY ENCAPSULATION algorithm (SIKE)
based on SIDH amongst a LWE key exchange and a
signature algorithm using symmetric-key primitives and
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [22]. SIKE is
also submitted to the NIST standardization process of
post-quantum cryptography schemes
In a youtube video of a Microsoft research session
where SIKE is presented to other researchers by
Christophe Petit, he states at the end: "I wouldn’t bet
national security on it". On the other hand, SIDH was
also denoted as "the hottest thing we have" in the key
note of the pqcrypto conference 2017.
Amendment
Paramater choices are much more delicate for post-
quantum crypto schemes than they are for classical ones.
Furthermore classical asymmetric schemes mostly rely
on number theory, a topic which has been studied in
early courses at universities, where post-quantum algo-
rithms include more mathematics from courses which
are usually taught at later stages of study courses.
It will not only be a challenge to distinguish and weigh
the complex influences on security of post-quantum en-
cryption schemes, there will also be an increased need
of cooperations between mathematicians, computer sci-
entists and programmers to mitigate flaws in implemen-
tations, configurations and applications.
For someone who is not familiar with the concept of
a mathematical conjecture, it is hard to understand on
what ground the security of cryptography is built and
what time can do to it, with or without regard to emerg-
ing technologies. Who can say for sure that there is
no-one who generates one RSA key pair after another
since decades and stores them in a huge database where
he can simply assign a private key to its public key if it
is present in his own collection? How many distinctive
usable key pairs can even be expected within the range
of a 4096-bit integer?
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